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This paper demonstrates the strong impacts that public job creation in social care provisioning 
has on employment creation. Furthermore, it shows that mobilizing underutilized domestic labor 
resources and targeting them to bridge gaps in community-based services yield strong pro-poor 
income growth patterns that extend throughout the economy. Social care provision also 
contributes to promoting gender equality, as women—especially from low-income 
households—constitute a major workforce in the care sector. We present the ex-ante policy 
simulation results from two country case studies: South Africa and the United States. Both 
social accounting matrix–based multiplier analysis and propensity ranking–based 
microsimulation provide evidence of the pro-poor impacts of the social care expansion.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
According to estimates by the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and International Labour Organization (ILO), since the onset of the 2007 global financial and 
economic crisis—the Great Recession—at least 30 million more women and men joined the 
ranks of the unemployed, for an astounding total of 200 million people out of a work. On a 
world scale, and combined with the fuel and food price spikes of 2008, over 150 million more 
than what was expected prior to the crisis have been trapped in poverty,
1 and recent price spikes 
are set to exacerbate these trends. Indeed, sudden declines in aggregate demand have always had 
serious repercussions for employment, and the evidence from previous financial crises shows 
that, despite stabilization of GDP growth, employment recovery in the aftermath of crises lags 
by five to seven years.
2  
Yet thin employment opportunities, especially for the poor, are not a problem exclusive 
to times of crisis. Most rural workers have access to agricultural work only seasonally and, 
therefore, despite distress migration, the uncertainty of a job is daunting; others work under 
highly informal conditions, suffering from underemployment and unpredictable spells of no 
employment at all. Own-account workers also depend too often on unstable sources and levels 
of income, with earnings from sales highly volatile.
3 In addition, some countries experience 
deeply rooted structural unemployment. In South Africa, for example, deeply structural factors 
have excluded about 25 percent of the population
4 from access to work opportunities for more 
than a decade and a half. Material deprivation is often accompanied by hopelessness, 
marginalization, social exclusion, exposure to increased violence, and susceptibility to 
dangerous ideologies.  
                                                           
1 See World Bank (2008a). The World Bank estimates that, due to the financial crisis, between 53 and 79 million 
people are falling below the poverty line of $1.25 and $2.00 per day, respectively; see Ravallion (2009). See 
also Shen and Ravallion (2009) and World Bank (2008b).  
2 Buvinic (2009). 
3 See the following contributions to Rodgers and Kuptsch (2008): J. A. Ocampo, “The Links between Economic 
and Social Policies: A Conceptual Framework”; E. Kalula, “The Decent Work Agenda: An African Perspective 
on Research Needs and Priorities”; and J. Ghosh, “New Research Questions in the Decent Work Agenda, a 
View from Asia.” See also ILO (2010). 
4 SSA (1998–2009). The latest unemployment figures place the unemployment rate for the fourth quarter of 2009 at 
24.3 percent. See stats online at http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/keyindicators.asp.  
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Even where there have been success stories, as is the case in some parts of the world—
Latin America in the last decade, in particular—inclusive growth has not taken sufficiently deep 
roots to lift the extremely and chronically deprived out of poverty. In the era of globalization, 
predictable and sufficiently well paying work opportunities remain beyond the reach of 1.4 
billion people living in extreme poverty, with half of this population having no access to paid 
work at all.  
Public job-creation programs, alternatively known as public works (PW) and 
employment guarantee (EG) schemes, have emerged as government initiatives that aim to 
redress seasonal, cyclical, and structural joblessness for the poor by offering a minimum-pay job 
to those ready and willing yet unable to find work. With a minimal wage effectively 
discouraging the better off from taking advantage of such programs as beneficiaries, the work 
entitlement and the income they offer provide a lifeline for the low-skilled poor. In this regard, 
when all else fails, the state effectively acts as the “employer of last resort.” Though many such 
program initiatives have been introduced over the years,
5 the best known and largest in scale are 
the New Deal programs (following the 1929 Great Depression) in the United States and the 
recent Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MG-NREGA) in India and 
the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) in South Africa, which were first introduced in 
2005-06 and 2004-05, respectively.  
When countries consider direct job creation through PW and EG programs, meaningful 
work projects need to be identified, and usually those prioritized are selected to bridge existing 
gaps in physical infrastructure. This paper argues that an additional target for work-project 
consideration is that of social care delivery. Gaps exist in care services for the young, the 
elderly, the sick, and the permanently ill or severely disabled. We show that investing in 
mobilizing unused domestic labor resources—that is, providing earned income to (previously 
unemployed) job holders that serve the needs of their communities—yields strong pro-poor 
income growth patterns, stronger than investment in other types of projects. But it also 
contributes to another key developmental goal: that of promoting gender equality. It does this in 
at least two ways: by reducing the burden of unpaid work for women and girls, and by 
                                                           
5 For a comprehensive history of such initiatives, see Kaboub (2007) and Antonopoulos (2009). As a 2007–09 crisis 
mitigation intervention, several countries, including China, introduced or expanded previously smaller-scale 
programs.   
4 
 
expanding and supplementing the income-earning options for women, which is certain to 
increase the labor force participation of women who live in poverty.  
Making progress in reaching development objectives—exemplified in the UN 
Millennium Development Goals—points to the extraordinary importance of public investment 
in areas traditionally understood as “women’s [unpaid] work.” From better health outcomes to 
clean water and sanitation, public spending is necessary. What needs to be made evident is that, 
in addition to human development, such spending makes good economic sense both from the 
standpoint of enriching human capital resources and from the standpoint of pro-poor 
development and growth.  
  Closing gaps today results in healthier, more educated citizens with higher productivity 
and income-earning potential tomorrow. The economics literature has highlighted, for instance, 
that early childhood development programs spur the cognitive as well as the noncognitive skills 
of children, which has positive economic impacts.
6 Caring for elderly and chronically ill patients 
at their homes has proved to be more cost effective than providing similar care under alternative 
institutional settings. In addition, the relief of time from unpaid care provisioning improves the 
chances for accessing paid work and/or the productivity of workers whose sick family members 
otherwise depend entirely on their care.
7 These social benefits, in and of themselves, warrant 
investment in public provisioning, but there exists a different and equally compelling argument, 
which is the focus of this paper.  
Shifting parts of unpaid care work to paid work
8 by expanding the domain of social 
services brings about powerful pro-poor and economy-wide employment outcomes that are 
superior, in fact, to those obtained in equally needed but less labor-intensive physical 
infrastructure investment. This is accomplished via the direct employment opportunities created, 
as well as indirect ones through inter-industry linkages and aggregate demand growth from the 
new jobs. Furthermore, there are distributional consequences of the job creation. We analyze 
                                                           
6 See Dickens, Sawhill, and Tebbs (2006) and Heckman and Masterov (2007) for macroeconomic impacts of the 
early education through productivity growth. Golin, Mitchell, and Gault (2004) provide a concise summary of 
literature review on a series of research on estimating benefits of a high-quality, intensive pilot projects—the 
Abecedarian project in North Carolina, HighScope Perry Preschool Study, and Title I Chicago Child-Parent 
Centers. Additional references include Barnett et al. (2004) and Barnett, Lamy, and Jung (2005). Heckman et al. 
(2010) provides a new summary on the cost-benefit analysis of the Perry Preschool program. 
7 The cost-effectiveness is documented in the medical literature; see, for example, Casiro et al. (1993) and Fields et 
al. (1991). See MetLife (2006) on the potential gain in worker productivity from paid care relief.  
8 For a comprehensive discussion on the intersections of gender inequality, paid and unpaid work, and employment 
guarantee programs, see Antonopoulos (2010).  
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therefore, in what follows, the direct and indirect job creation and the distributional impacts of 
social care expansion through employment for two countries, South Africa and the United 
States. Our specific focus lies on the effects of labor demand adjustment on employment and 
income via expanding public service delivery. To the best of our knowledge, the topic has been 
overlooked in the literature.
9 
The paper is organized as follows. Following this section, section 2 presents our 
methodology and data; section 3 shows the employment impacts of the proposed interventions, 
while section 4 discusses the income distribution and poverty reduction results we obtain. 
Section 5 concludes. Before turning to the next section, we conclude section 1 by presenting the 
economic and social contexts within which social care expansion’s impacts are proposed and, 
subsequently, evaluated through an ex ante simulation exercise.  
 
Background Context: Unemployment and Social Care Investment in South Africa and the 
United States  
South Africa 
The persistent high unemployment rates in South Africa in the aftermath of the apartheid era 
(see Figure 4) compelled the government to introduce the EPWP direct job-creation initiative in 
2004. The program consists of job opportunities provided to unskilled, unemployed, poor 
individuals who work on projects that are labor intensive.  
 
                                                           
9   It should be noted, though, that we do not attempt to estimate the impact of social care on the changes in 
mothers’ labor force participation rates; see Bergemann and van den Berg (2006), Blau and Tekin (2007), 
Kimmel (1995), and Lefebvre and Merrigan (2008), among others. Nor do we endogenize the labor supply 
response of newly hired workers in the social care network whose family members are recipients of the care   
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Figure 1. Unemployment Rates by Gender in South Africa (in percent) 
 
 
Source: Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 6th ed., Geneva: ILO, 2009 
 
They are hired at a minimum wage and, while receiving training and accreditation, they 
provide services for their communities. There are three main EPWP sectors designated for job 
creation: (1) labor-intensive physical infrastructure investments, including the building of roads, 
bridges, and irrigation systems; (2) environmental investments—creating work opportunities in 
public environmental improvement programs; and (3) social service—–creating work 
opportunities in public social programs, with a focus on home- and community-based care 
(HCBC) and early childhood development (ECD).  
HCBC provides comprehensive services, including health and social services, by formal 
and informal caregivers in the home, aiming to restore and maintain a person’s comfort, 
function, and health, including providing care toward a dignified death. The prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria has accentuated the need for expanding service delivery. 
As of 2003, there were 892 HCBC sites, mostly run by nongovernmental organizations with the 
help of volunteers. As an employment program, the EPWP-HCBC program targeted the unpaid 
volunteers who were unemployed and often the adult dependents of the terminally ill and people 
living with the sick family members who were not in receipt of a state grant. 
The ECD program set out to provide temporary jobs, skills and accreditation to 19,800 
practitioners over five years, who would earn income but also would be involved in training, 
thereby improving the care and learning environment of children. The target workers were 















ECD programs. It was envisaged that they could be reached through (a) learnerships leading to 
various levels of educational attainment and qualifications corresponding to accreditation of 
teacher aides, kindergarten teachers, et cetera; (b) work/employment/skills programs for very 
low-skilled, unemployed people to be recruited and trained in sites designated for receiving 
indigent subsidies; (c) direct and immediate creation of work opportunities in targeted ECD sites 
in very poor areas; (d) on-the-job training and certification for ECD support staff, such as 
vegetable and legume gardeners, cooks and administrators; and (e) short-term, three-month 
employment opportunities in auxiliary tasks for 3,000 unemployed parents through existing 
schools and local authorities.  
Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) proposes a massive scaling up of EPWP if the program is 
to reduce unemployment, as the existing scale was incommensurate to the jobless problem at 
hand. Specifically, they propose the development of an ECD cadre that would extend the range, 
duration, and number of job opportunities to include two-year appointments for child care 
workers, school nutrition workers, teachers’ aides, school caretakers, school clerical workers, 
cooks, vegetable gardeners, and administrators for local ECD sites. The proposed expansion of 
HCBC program would create a cadre of community health workers, nutrition and food security 
workers, direct-observation therapy practitioners, and TB and malaria officers. The scale of the 
proposed expansion is 9.3 billion rand, roughly 1 percent of GDP in 2000. This scale would 
cover the ECD of all children living in poor households and about 20 percent of the population, 
mostly those in need of home-based care for HIV/AIDS patients. They analyzed ex ante policy 
impacts of expanding social care provisions under EPWP, using a social accounting matrix 
(SAM)–based multiplier analysis. 
United States 
The Jobless recovery is a hallmark of the Great Recession. Figure 2 shows the trends in duration 
and severity of employment losses in the seven recessions since 1969. For each spell of 
recession, a seasonally adjusted nonfarm payroll employment level is indexed to be 100 at the 
start of the downturn and plotted to a period ranging 10 months before the onset to 40 months 
afterward. The current recession (the line with red diamonds on the graph) started with a 
moderate impact on employment for the first 12 months, but unleashed its full destructive force 




Figure 2. Nonfarm Payroll Extended Job Loss Trend from the Last  




Source: Current Employment Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, via Federal  
Reserve Economic Data (FRED2) issued by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
 
Similar to the South Africa study, Antonopoulos et al. (2010) investigates the impacts of 
investing in localized community-based social care services; in particular, home-based health 
care and early childhood development as an effective employment policy. Instead of short-term 
public sector employment as a countercyclical measure, this proposal calls for a permanent 
expansion of public service delivery that, as it turns out, mostly hires women. Their stable 
earnings may dampen volatile income shocks from highly cyclical male-oriented jobs, such as 
construction. An aging population and advances in medicine are extending life expectancy of 
the elderly and disabled patients for who HBC can be cost effective without compromising 
quality of care. In 2007 alone, almost 1.5 million seniors and disabled persons received home-
based care, according to the National Home Health Aide Survey. The ECD programs for 
children from poor households—Head Start and Early Head Start—are not reaching the 
intended group, with merely 21 percent of eligible kids participating (Iruka and Carver 2006).  
Home-based care in the United States consists of managed health care that deals with 
basic medical care for post-operative recuperation, managing chronic illness, and other 
noninvasive care performed by nurses and nursing assistants. The early childhood development 
programs offer child care with an educational component—for cognitive and noncognitive 
growth—for children under age five, before they enter a school-based educational system.   
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Most of the workers in these occupations are women. In home-based health care, 88 
percent of the care providers are women and minorities (52 percent), especially African 
American women (30 percent). Recent immigrants constitute 21 percent of the workforce. The 
wage rate is low, at $10.31 as of 2008 on average, and the annual mean earnings are $21,440 
(King et al. 2009). The majority of jobs in early childhood development are preschool teachers 
and assistants and child care workers, whose average wage rate is $11.32 per hour—much lower 
than private industry average of $18.08 (BLS 2009a).  
Previous studies
10 assessing both long-term and short-term benefits of expanding social 
care did not take into account distributional impacts of employment in the sector: who would 
receive jobs from the expansion and how much income they would receive from the jobs. 
Employment opportunities created directly and indirectly from the expansion may or may not 
reach the disadvantaged groups in the labor market—women, the less educated, and poor 
households—depending on the occupations and industries in which these jobs are created. A job 
as an administrator in the health care industry is likely to be held by a highly educated male 
worker from an affluent household, while a less-educated woman from a middle-class 
household would be more likely to take a job as a child care provider or preschool teacher. The 
individual characteristics of workers determine their likelihood of employment, and earnings 
vary across occupations and industries. We use a microsimulation method based on statistical 
matching techniques to analyze the distributional issues.  
To highlight the employment effects of the investment in care, we compare the results to 
that of investing in infrastructure construction. Our policy simulations consist of $50 billion on 
increasing final demand for social care versus for construction. We find that investment in care 
is a more cost effective and equitable way to create jobs than infrastructure construction.  
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
Input-output analysis depicting Inter-industry linkages through which multiplicative processes 
generate employment seems an appropriate tool to assess the industry-specific, ex ante policy at 
the macro level. Absence of price changes in the analysis seems a secondary concern in a 
recessionary environment in which inflationary pressures from a large-scale policy intervention 
are negligible and slack conditions are prevalent in factor markets.  
                                                           
10 See Antonopoulos et al. (2010) for a summary of the literature   
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We demonstrate two different methods to assign jobs created by the policy simulations. 
A social accounting matrix with various household types decomposed by relevant demographic 
and economic characteristics is used in the South African case study. The detailed 
decomposition makes it feasible to incorporate a flexible job-targeting scheme to maximize the 
poverty reduction effect.
11 The method is simple, and it is intuitively easy to grasp the 
underlying mechanism of job creation. A drawback, however, is that we cannot examine within-
group heterogeneity that is a part of the ideal distributional impact analysis. A microsimulation 
technique enhances the distributional impact analyses. The statistical technique in the US case 
study is a propensity ranking system with multiple imputations, instead of estimating behavioral 
functions of labor supply and earnings of the population. The method emphasizes the effects of 
individual characteristics on each individual, rather than estimating the group-supply function 
by exploiting variations across individuals. 
South Africa: SAM–based Multiplier Analysis 
Multiplier analysis based on the SAM thus provides an adequate simulation platform to analyze 
policy impacts on disaggregated subgroups of households as well as industries. The method 
accounts for multiplicative direct and indirect impacts of an external demand stimulus. This 
method, however, rests on the supposition that the technical coefficients of production remain 
constant. Hence, modification of the SAM is necessary if an intended simulation exercise 
entails, in one form or another—a new technology requirement stemming from the labor 
intensity requirement of the EPWP, for instance.  
An administrative requirement for intensive use of unskilled and poor workers with a 
large-scale intervention renders a new sector in terms of input composition and linkages to the 
rest of the economy. To incorporate the labor-intensity requirement of the EPWP, we develop a 
simple hypothetical integration method to circumvent a rebalancing of the SAM without 
sacrificing the accuracy of multiplier-effect analysis. A new hypothetical sector is simply 
inserted into the existing SAM, as shown in Table 1, with a scaled-down value of its gross 
output. The scaling down generates insignificant values for new accounts associated with the 
sector and, hence, may not violate an acceptable margin of error used in a conventional 
technical balancing. The insignificant values, however, preserve backward linkages that 
generate multiplicative effects of the intervention on the sector. The method is also flexible 
                                                           
11 See Appendix D of Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) for more on the job allocation formula   
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enough to incorporate policy exercises (in this study, employment targeting for the poor) into 
the SAM (Kim 2008).  
 
Table 1. A Reformulated Schematic SAM 
 
  Factors  EPWP Factors  Households  Activities  EPWP Sector  Exoge-
nous 
Factors  0    0  Factor Incomes  0  … 
EPWP Factors  0  0  0  0  Factor Incomes  … 
Households  Distribution  Distribution  Redistribution  0  0  … 









0  … 
Exogenous  …  …  …  …  0  … 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
The original South African SAM includes 26 productive sectors and 20 different 
household types, decomposed by location, residence type, race, and three-tiered income level. 
Construction of the hypothetical sector, called the EPWP social sector, relies on the data from 
Friedman et al. (2007). They describe detailed input costs for a social service initiative under the 
EPWP in South Africa. The initiative focuses on two projects: early childhood development 
(ECD) projects and home- and community-based care (HCBC). The projects are more labor 
intensive and employ more women and unskilled labor than the existing education and health 
sectors. Wage payments for unskilled labor account for 32 percent of the total expenditure for 
the initiative, as compared to 4 to 7 percent for relevant sectors in the economy. Wage payments 
for unskilled women account for 19 percent of the total expenditure vis-à-vis 2 to 5 percent from 
the relevant sectors. The total size of the injection (9.3 billion rand) is equivalent to 1 percent of 
the South African GDP at factor costs, or 8 percent of the total value of output of the relevant 
sectors—namely, education and health—measured by total production costs.
12  
 The policy simulation is to increase the final demand for social care services—early 
childhood development and home- and community-based health care—by 9.3 billion rand, 
                                                           
12 See Table A1 in the Appendix for the sectoral input composition of the education, health, and EPWP social care 
sectors.   
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roughly 1 percent of GDP in 2000. For comparison purposes, we also simulate a infrastructure 
construction expansion of the same magnitude. Using administrative data on a sample water 
reticulation project—a water-main installation—we construct a new EPWP infrastructure 
sector.
13 We devise a formula-based employment targeting for direct EPWP unskilled jobs to 
the poor, taking into account the unemployment rate, depth of poverty, and size of population by 
each poor household type. The formula is in no way a socially optimal allocation of jobs, but 
rather an attempt to incorporate the degree of hardship and a plain idea of fairness across 
various poor household types. Table 2 shows the resulting allocation of the direct unskilled jobs. 
African ultrapoor (household income below the 25thpercentile) households living in ex-
homelands—rural tribal regions—receive the most jobs largely due to the relatively large 
number of households among the poor (23 percent of all poor) and the second-deepest poverty 
based on their mean household income, according to the South African National Household 
Survey in 2000.  
 
 
                                                           
13 The new sector is constructed from administrative data on a water-main installation contract under the EPWP. For 
the intermediate input composition, the authors examined the detailed expense records from the project and 
reclassified them according to the industry classifications used in the SAM. The wage payment records reveal 
the labor composition by skill level, and gender decomposition follows the existing pattern within the 
construction industry in the SAM. The new infrastructure sector may not be the best representation of all the 
infrastructure projects under the EPWP, but it represents the labor-intensity requirement. For instance, wages for 
male unskilled workers account for 19 percent of total expenditures in the EPWP water project, but only 12 
percent in the construction sector. Moreover, unskilled job distribution in the existing structure is more biased 
toward nonpoor workers than in the targeting scheme developed in the paper.   
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Table 2. Employment Targeting: Shares of EPWP Unskilled Jobs 
 
Household Type  Shares of EPWP 
Unskilled Jobs 
(%) 
 Urban Formal African Poor  3.5 
 Urban Formal African Ultrapoor  16.3 
 Urban Formal Colored Poor  0.5 
 Urban Formal Colored Ultrapoor  1.8 
 Urban Informal African Poor  2.5 
 Urban Informal African Ultrapoor  6.8 
 Rural Commercial African Poor  2.6 
 Rural Commercial African Ultrapoor  13.8 
 Rural Commercial Colored Poor  0.1 
 Rural Commercial Colored Ultrapoor  0.3 
 Ex-homeland African Poor  8.5 
 Ex-homeland African Ultrapoor  43.3 
Note: Nonpoor households are excluded to emphasize the targeting  
nature of the program. See appendix D of Antonopoulos and Kim  
(2008) for more details on the formula. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
United States: Input-Output and Microsimulation 
To analyze the employment impact of our proposed intervention we combine two different 
quantitative methods; at the macro level we make use of input-output analysis and at the micro 
level we employ a microsimulation model. Input-output analysis allows for calculation of 
aggregate changes in employment, while the microsimulation distributes these jobs by matching 
them to individuals who are most likely to occupy them based on nationally representative 
survey data.  
The employment multiplier matrix is computed from the US input-output table, which 
includes 201 detailed industries. The detailed classification allows distinction of specific 
industries under the care sector—home-based health care and early childhood development.
14 
                                                           
14 The induced multiplier effects from household consumption of goods and services are not included in the study, 
as the multipliers seem too high to be relevant. Other studies—for instance, Pollin, Heintz, and Garrett-Peltier 
(2009)—econometrically estimate the induce effects separately. We chose to underestimate the total effects by 
dropping the induced effects, instead of the ad hoc treatment.  
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The jobs created directly and indirectly from the multiplicative process are classified by industry 
and occupation based on the National Industry-Occupation Employment Matrix compiled by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. This step produces a cross-tabulation of jobs by industry and 
occupation that subsequently feeds into the microsimulation.  
To assign jobs, we create a statistical ranking of occupations and industries for each 
individual by estimating the likelihood of their being employed in each job category. The 
method is to estimate a multinomial probit regression by industry and occupation and then 
predict probabilities for each.
15 For each individual, industries and occupations are ranked based 
on the highest propensity score. Then we estimate the likelihood of employment for each 
individual, using a probit regression and propensity score.
16 With these three sets of 
information, we then assign employment status to each individual in the employable pool using 
an iterative procedure, stepping through industry and occupation pairs, selecting those 
individuals most likely to be employed in that industry-occupation pair, in order of their 
likelihood to be employed, until all of the available jobs were assigned. Once we assign jobs, we 
allocate earnings to those individuals who receive a new job. The method was imputation by hot 
decking.
17  
Our policy simulation assumes an investment of $50 billion on projects that increase 
social care provisioning. Divided equally between home-based health care and early childhood 
development for children under the age of five, this amount is equivalent to one half of the total 
gross output of the two industries combined in 2006. In input-output analysis, the spending is 
interpreted as the increase in final demand of commodities by the amount. The increased final 
demand for child day care (North American Industry Classification System, NAICS 6244) and 
home health care services (NAICS 6216) leads to increasing labor demand in both industries, 
directly as well as in other industries that supply intermediate inputs to them. The injection of 
funds into the relevant private sectors, not to general government, reflects the current 
mechanism for the bulk of service delivery. In other words, although centers that act as service 
                                                           
15 Independent variables for the industry and occupation multinomial logits were census division, metropolitan 
status, age, marital status, sex, educational attainment, and race. 
16 Independent variables for the employment probit were census division, metropolitan status, age, age squared, 
marital status, sex, educational attainment, and race. 
17 A three-stage Heckit model was used to predict imputed wage and usual hours for each individual in the 
pool,within age-sex cells. These, together with census division, metropolitan status, marital status, spouse’s 
labor-force status, industry and occupation of assigned job, and dummies for the age category of the youngest  
child and the number of children, were used in the imputation procedure.  
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providers must meet certain state-level criteria, these entities do not act as government 
contractors whose activities otherwise would have fallen into the government production 
category.
18  
In the following sections, we analyze the results from the two case studies on 
employment, income distribution, and poverty reduction.  
 
3.  EMPLOYMENT  
Care provision by nonhousehold institutions, public or private, can address unemployment and 
the poverty of women simultaneously, as they form the majority of workers in the relevant 
industries and earnings from their paid work contributes to their household income. The indirect 
employment generation from multiplier effects is not trivial, and the magnitude largely depends 
on the intensity and diversity of input sources—in other words, the strength of the backward 
linkages. In this section, we introduce two case studies from South Africa and the United States, 
focusing on the employment generation potential of bringing unpaid care work into the paid 
work domain. 
South Africa 
Table 3 exhibits the number of full-year jobs created from the simulation. The injection, 
equivalent to 1 percent of GDP in 2000, on the social sector generates 571,505 direct jobs in the 
sector, while the linkages to other sectors and households generate 192,893 jobs. The 
requirement on labor intensity under the EPWP allocates the majority of direct EPWP jobs to 
unskilled workers (545,191), while only 26,314 jobs go to skilled workers, resulting in a 20.7 
unskilled to one skilled job ratio. Overall, for every three jobs created due to the social care 
expansion, an additional job opens up within the economy. Job creation within the care sector 
turns out to be greater for women than for men across skilled and unskilled categories. The 
infrastructure expansion of the same scale yields 262,405 jobs within the new construction 
sector, as it generates 138,842 indirect jobs. The direct-to-indirect job ratio is 1.9, which is 
expected as the exogenous wage rates for the sector are 1.5 to 1.7 times higher than they are in 
the social care sector.  
                                                           
18  A small exception to this convention  was made for pre-K facilities under local school systems, which are 
counted as government activities under the current industry account convention, and thus may  not suit the 
industry assumption. However, dominance of private providers allows us to use the “private” assumption in the 
study, even if care comes from “social” provisioning.  
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Table 3. Direct and Indirect Job Creation by Gender and Skill Level from Social Sector Expansion 
















Direct   317,007  16,386  228,184  9,928  571,505  545,191  26,314 
Indirect   66,149  22,638  71,789  33,207  193,783  137,938  55,845 
Total  383,156  39,024  299,973  43,135  765,288  683,129  82,159 















Direct   5,201  2,306  218,224  36,674  262,405  223,425  38,980 
Indirect   46,487  17,936  48,242  26,177  138,842  94,729  44,113 
Total  51,688  20,242  266,466  62,851  401,247  318,154  83,093 
 
Source: Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) and authors’ calculations 
 
Distribution of employment by household-level poverty status is illustrated in Table 4. 
There are over 11 million workers from nonpoor households that comprise 62 percent (11.2 
million) of the total labor force; meanwhile, 2.6 million out of 6.4 million unemployed are from 
the nonpoor household type. The unemployment rate by poverty status reflects the inequality in 
the labor market: 23.1 percent for the nonpoor type, whereas 62.9 percent of the ultrapoor type 
is unemployed. Ultrapoor workers receive most of EPWP direct jobs (78 percent) as designed in 
the allocation formula. However, over 88 percent of indirect jobs (170287/193783) belong to 
workers from nonpoor households, for the distribution follows the wage-income flow in the 
South African SAM.
19 As much as the highly unequal distribution reflects the selection of skill 
level of workers into poverty status, it demonstrates the need for a direct intervention in the 
labor market to ameliorate the perpetual inequality in the economy. The smaller number of 
EPWP unskilled jobs in the infrastructure sector means fewer jobs for poor and ultrapoor 
households than in the care sector. The shares of indirect jobs by household type follow an 
approximately identical distribution as in the care case, with 88 percent of indirect jobs to the 
nonpoor households and the remaining 9 and 3 percent to the poor and the ultrapoor, 
                                                           





20 The skill-intensive nature of infrastructure puts the workers from poor 
households at a disadvantage, and attributes to the higher unemployment rates ex post compared 
to social care. 
 
Table 4. Labor Market Condition and Jobs Received, by Household Type 
 
    Base    Jobs Created: Social Care 
  Labor Force  Unemployed  UE (%)  Direct  Indirect  UE (%) 
Nonpoor  11,282,393           2,604,134    23.1    26,028   170,287   21.3  
Poor    3,875,849    1,910,895   49.3     96,776   17,190   46.4  
Ultrapoor    3,084,604           1,940,813    62.9   448,701   5,416   48.2  
            
    Base    Jobs Created: Infrastructure 
  Labor Force  Unemployed  UE (%)  Direct  Indirect  UE (%) 
Nonpoor  11,282,393           2,604,134    23.1   3,8701  122,944  21.6 
Poor    3,875,849    1,910,895   49.3   3,9808  12,035  48.0 
Ultrapoor    3,084,604           1,940,813    62.9   183,897  3,795  56.8 
 
Source: Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) and authors’ calculations 
 
United States 
A 50 percent expansion of the social care sector—early childhood education and home-based 
care for elderly and chronically ill patients—in terms of gross output in 2006, equivalent to $50 
billion, generates approximately 1.2 million jobs in the economy, of which 8 out of 10 new jobs 
(956082/1186342) are within the care sector (Table 5). The same level of expansion in 
infrastructure construction and maintenance yields half a million jobs, with 6 out of 10 new jobs 
(345955/555942) in the construction sector.   
                                                           
20 This is true even with very different intermediate input compositions between the two cases. It implies that 
higher-order effects outweigh the secondary effects via backward linkages.  
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Table 5. Total Employment Distribution across Industries 
 
Industry  Social Care  Infrastructure 
Agriculture          2,928             1,969  
Mining             520             2,463  
Utilities             773             1,808  
Construction          4,489         345,955  
Manufacturing        16,797           46,402  
Wholesale          7,139           11,421  
Retail          4,432           36,628  
Transportation and Warehousing          7,020           12,715  
Information          4,989             4,312  
Financial and Real Estate services        13,621           11,474  
Professional and Business services        57,672           55,675  
Education             688                719  
Health Care and Social Assistance        21,046                675  
Social Care       956,082                107  
Leisure and Hospitality        15,650             6,509  
Other services          3,113             5,009  
Government        69,384           12,099  
Total   1,186,342        555,942  
 
Source: Antonopoulos et al. (2010) 
 
Table 6 depicts the job distribution in absolute numbers and shares by various 
characteristics of the workers hired, including the unemployed and some persons out of the 
labor force for reasons other than retirement or illness. A microsimulation based on propensity-
score matching is used to assign the new jobs by matching potential workers’ socioeconomic 
characteristics to the job openings. The gender composition of job assignments shows almost 
exactly inverse ratios between social care and construction. Over 90 percent of jobs go to 
women in social sector investment, as more than 80 percent of jobs are created within the sector. 
On the other hand, infrastructure construction generates over 88 percent of jobs for men, as most 
jobs (almost 71 percent) are created in male-dominated industries—construction and 
manufacturing.  The decomposition of job assignments by educational attainment highlights the 
greater inclusiveness of social care investment. Over 42 percent of jobs generated by the latter 
go to people with less than a high school diploma, compared to only 14 percent of jobs created 
by the infrastructure investment for this most disadvantaged group in the labor market. In the 
infrastructure case, the majority of jobs (62.6 percent) are assigned to workers with high school 
diplomas. This fact is largely driven by the construction-related jobs typically held by men with 
high school diplomas. Although social care investment more highly favors the group with less  
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than a high school diploma, it also provides more opportunities to people with at least some 
higher education than does infrastructure investment (31.1 to 23.4 percent, respectively). This 
reflects the certificate requirement for preschool teachers and certain childcare providers that are 
under state or federal regulations for reimbursement purposes. On the other hand, infrastructure 
investment raises the demand for engineers and architects, jobs the Standard Occupational 
Classification system identifies as a part of the “professional and business services industry and 
professional occupations.” Typically, these occupations require a college-degree level of 
education, which accounts for the job assignment—in our simulation—to higher-education 
attainment groups.  
The inclusive nature of social care investment is further reinforced by the job assignment 
by household annual income. Forty-five percent of jobs go to workers from households with 
income below the 4th
 decile (approximately $39,000 a year). Home health aides, who comprise 
one of the major occupation groups in social care, are mainly women from low-income 
households: 45 percent of the workers are from households under 200 percent of the federal 
poverty line.
21 The social care expansion thus aids those workers specifically. The infrastructure 
case, on the other hand, provides one half of the jobs created to workers from the middle-
income group. 
 
                                                           
21 It is not clear whether the low skill requirements of care work attracts unskilled workers from low-income 
households or the low wage rates of care work cause workers to be in low-income households. It may be jointly 
determined, and thus a direction of causality is hard to establish.   
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Table 6. Distribution of Jobs Created by Public Investment on Social Care and 
Infrastructure in the United States  
 
Social Care  Jobs Assigned 
  Number  Percent 
Gender     
Male  116,525  9.9 
Female  1,059,401  90.1 
Education     
Less than HS  500,959  42.6 
HS Grad  308,810  26.3 
Some College  196,407  16.7 
College Grad  169,750  14.4 
HH Income     
1st-4th decile  530,763  45.1 
5th-8th decile  395,846  33.7 
9th-10th decile  249,330  21.2 
Total  1,175,939  100.0 
 
Infrastructure  Jobs Assigned 
  Number  Percent 
Gender     
Male  489,814  88.6 
Female  63,051  11.4 
Education     
Less than HS  77,482  14.0 
HS Grad  345,897  62.6 
Some College  46,609  8.4 
College Grad  82,877  15.0 
HH Income     
1st-4th decile  194,915  35.3 
5th-8th decile  279,438  50.5 
9th-10th decile  78,516  14.2 
Total  552,869  100.0 
 
 
Source: Antonopoulos et al. (2010) 
 
4.  EFFECTS ON INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
The large-scale employment policies pose consequences on household income and inequality. 
How the jobs are distributed, either by targeting design of the program or the private market 
system, influences overall income inequality. The composition of workers in affected industries, 
as well as the inter-industry linkages, largely shapes the outcome. The targeted nature of the 
EPWP contributes to the income growth of the poor and ultrapoor workers, although the total 
impacts are not as great as they would be under the more equitable labor market. The relatively 
low skill requirements tend to benefit the workers from poor households in the United States.  
We examine the effects of the proposed policy intervention on income growth and 
inequality using the concept of “pro-poor” growth as defined by Kakwani, Khandker, and Son 
(2004). This study defines growth as being pro-poor only when income growth is higher for the 
poor than for the nonpoor. As we will see below, even when we include indirect job creation in 
the calculations, EPWP job creation allocates jobs in a manner that results in pro-poor growth.  
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In the case of the United States, it is the very composition of workers in the care sector—mostly 
women from low-income households—that accounts for the pro-poor nature of the investment 
in social care. Poverty reduction follows naturally, as the wage earnings contribute to the 
workers’ household income. The depth of poverty predetermines the extent to which the 
external margin of poverty is reduced. Regardless, the investment attributes to the reduction in 
the internal margin of poverty.  
South Africa 
Table 7 shows aggregated changes of income and distribution across nonpoor, poor, and 
ultrapoor household groups. It is worthwhile to note that even with the targeted job distribution 
in favor of the poor and ultrapoor, most of the income growth goes to the nonpoor, since they 
harness most of the highly paid skilled jobs and most of the unskilled jobs from indirect effects. 
The biased benefit distribution highlights the sharply skewed employment-income distribution 
to the nonpoor. It may be the case that employment determines the poverty. Even within the 
argument of direction of causality, one cannot deny the strong evidence of the dependence on 
wage income overall and the lack of viable self-employment opportunities for the poor and 
ultrapoor in South Africa, in which total income of the bottom half is less than 8 percent of the 
top half of the population. The skewed base income gives rise to the higher income growth rates 
for the poor and ultrapoor—2.6 and 16.4 percent growth, respectively—compared to a 1.3 
percent incline for the nonpoor. Scaling up the social care sector at the level of 1 percent of 
GDP may not make a large difference in terms of overall income distribution. However, it 
should be remembered that the participating households do receive significant benefits from the 
program. 
In the infrastructure expansion, the income changes reflect the skill-biased job creation 
that benefits nonpoor households in that the income growth for the group remains similar. 
Meanwhile, total income growth for the poor and ultrapoor households is around a half the level 
in the social care expansion.    
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Table 7. Changes in Aggregate Income Level by Household Group  
(In millions of rand) 
 
Social Sector  Nonpoor  Poor  Ultrapoor 
Base (pre-intervention)  640,846  38,410  15,986 
Increment         8,496           983         2,620  
New     649,342      39,393       18,606  
% Change 
Base (pre-intervention)  100  100  100 
Increment  1.3  2.6  16.4 
New  101.3  102.6  116.4 
Income Distribution 
Base (pre-intervention)  92.2  5.5  2.3 
Increment  70.2  8.1  21.7 
New  91.8  5.6  2.6 
                      
Infrastructure  Nonpoor  Poor  Ultrapoor 
Base (pre-intervention)  640,846  38,410  15,986 
Increment         8,396   611         1,153  
New  649,239  39,494  16,666 
% Change 
Base (pre-intervention)  100  100  100 
Increment  1.3  1.6  7.2 
New  101.3  101.6  107.2 
Income Distribution 
Base (pre-intervention)  92.2  5.5  2.3 
Increment  82.6  6.0  11.3 
New  92.0  5.5  2.4 
 
Source: Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table 8 displays the poverty reduction effects for participating households only. The 
income of participating households shows the opposite trends: the poor and ultrapoor 
households move further above the poverty line under the infrastructure expansion. The result is 
simply attributable to the higher wage rates (1.7 times higher) in the infrastructure case. Under 
the social care expansion, the program wage rate for unskilled workers is exogenously set 
comparable to the near–poverty level, minimum wage rate to impose a certain degree of self-
targeting. The higher participation rates of households in the EPWP programs under the social  
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care expansion is reflective of the lower wage rates and more labor-intensive nature of care 
provision.   
 







Depth of Poverty 
 
Before              After 





(as % of total households) 
 
Care               Infrastructure 
Urban Formal 
African Poor  15,513  -480  6,240  10,974   3.0  1.3 
Urban Formal 
African Ultrapoor  18,770  -10,952  -4,232  502   29.2  12.0 
Urban Formal 
Colored Poor  16,458  -429  6,291  11,026   2.8  1.1 
Urban Formal 
Colored Ultrapoor  16,277  -8,861  -2,141  2,594   24.2  9.9 
Urban Informal 
African Poor  12,196  -860  5,860  10,595   4.4  1.8 
Urban Informal 
African Ultrapoor  14,630  -8,496  -1,776  2,958   23.2  9.5 
Rural Comm. 
 African Poor  13,801  -1,051  5,669  10,403   4.6  1.9 
Rural Comm.  
African Ultrapoor  18,595  -10,794  -4,074  661   26.6  10.9 
Rural Comm. 




15,833  -8,100  -1,380  3,355   19.7  8.1 
Ex-homeland 
 African Poor  14,079  -1,333  5,387  10,121   5.6  2.3 
Ex-homeland  
African Ultrapoor  17,375     -10,354  -3,634  1,101   25.5  10.5 
 
Source: Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) and authors’ calculations 
 
A closed system of the SAM enables us to examine the multiplier effects on macro 
indicators. In the case of social care expansion, the 1 percent spending on social care expansion 
produces an extra 0.8 percent GDP growth, as in Table 9. Significant spending on food, a part of 
care services in Friedman et al. (2007), boosts the production in agriculture directly, while other 
sectors benefit from multiplier effects of indirect backward linkages as well. The infrastructure 
expansion benefits the manufacturing sector the most due to the heavy use of manufactured 
intermediate inputs. But the net GDP growth is lower, at 0.68 percent, after deducting the 
original injection equivalent to 1 percent of GDP. The lower GDP in level terms comes in part 
from the higher shares of intermediate input composition in the infrastructure case.  
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Table 10 shows the multiplier effects on tax revenue. Sales and indirect taxes are paid by 
the industries, while the “direct tax” is another name for income taxes paid by the individuals. 
On average, the manufacturing sector pays higher share of their gross output on sales taxes (4-7 
percent with 22 percent on petrol products, compared to 1-6 percent on the service sector), 
according to the SAM. Nonpoor households pay higher tax rates in terms of percent of their 
income, and that contributes to the higher direct tax receipt in the case of infrastructure 
expansion. The social care expansion—effectively, aggregate demand stimulus—increases tax 
revenue by 1.5 percent, or over 3 billion rand, equivalent to over a third of total spending on the 
social care expansion. The infrastructure expansion collects 2.9 billion rand, which raises the tax 
revenue growth by 1.3 percent. The positive macroeconomic impacts prove that the social care 
expansion is a viable policy tool that not only addresses the unemployment among the poor but 
also improves macroeconomic conditions.  
 
Table 9. Impacts on Sectoral and GDP Growth (in millions of rand) 
 
  Agriculture  Manufacturing  Services  GDP 
(value added) 
Base  241,457  1,132,106  1,040,440  835,651 
Increment (care)  9,850  12,087  14,696  15,167 
Growth Rate (%)  4.08  1.07  1.41  1.81 
Increment (infra.)  2,562  13,148  12,316  14,078 
Growth Rate (%)  1.06  1.16  1.18  1.68 
 
Source: Antonopoulos and Kim (2008) and authors’ calculations     
 
Table 10. Multiplier Effects on Tax Revenue (in millions of rand) 
 
  Sales  Indirect  Direct  Total 
Base  83,933  18,529  121,085  223,548 
Increment (care)  1,484  276  1,547  3,308 
Growth Rate (%)  1.8  1.5  1.3  1.5 
Increment (infra.)  1,037  253  1,642  2,932 
Growth Rate (%)  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.3 
 





Tables 11a and 11b show the changes in individual median and mean earnings of those who are 
assigned jobs in social care and infrastructure construction. The comparison highlights the 
disparate distributional impacts of the two investments. It is noteworthy to mention that the 
mean-to-median earnings ratio decreases as the level of educational attainment increases among 
workers. It is more so for workers in social care than in infrastructure construction, which is 
indicative of the stronger equalizing effect of social care investment.  
Workers with less than a high school diploma tend to benefit the most in relative terms 
from both of the simulated investments compared to workers with higher levels of educational 
attainment. Their median and mean earnings increase the most among all the groups. 
Infrastructure construction turns out to raise earnings of the least educated workers more than 
social care investment does. The result is attributable to much higher hourly wage rates of 
construction workers—$21.87 on average within the industry (BLS 2009b). Even unskilled 
construction laborers earn more than $14.30 per hour, significantly more than the $11.30 per 
hour that a preschool teacher earns on average. For the least-educated workers in social care, ex 
ante median earnings ($3,120) are less than half of mean earnings ($7,641), which suggests a 
highly skewed distribution of the least educated workers along their earnings level. Thus, the 
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Table 11a. Changes in Median Earnings by Individual 
  Social Care  Infrastructure 
Education  Before  After  Change (%)  Before  After  Change (%) 
Less than HS       3,120          7,000           124.4          7,000       17,000   142.9 
HS Grad     15,000        26,500             76.7        18,000       30,000   66.7 
Some College     14,000        30,000           114.3        15,000       30,002   100.0 
College Grad     26,000        55,000           111.5        28,000       52,000   85.7 
Income              
1st–4th decile       7,000        22,029           214.7          8,060       27,500   241.2 
5th–8th decile     20,000        30,000             50.0        22,000       33,000   50.0 
9th–10th decile     30,000        34,002             13.3        35,000       38,000   8.6 
         
        Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 11b. Changes in Mean Earnings by Individual 
  Social Care  Infrastructure 
Education  Before  After  Change (%)  Before  After  Change (%) 
Less than HS     7,641      12,893            68.7     11,583   21,900   89.1 
HS Grad   21,654      31,382            44.9     23,163   35,304   52.4 
Some College   22,950      33,169            44.5     23,994   33,960   41.5 
College Grad   44,475      67,694            52.2     45,693   69,284   51.6 
Income              
1st–4th decile     9,940      29,862         200.4     10,863   33,787   211.0 
5th–8th decile   23,503      40,183            71.0     25,227   43,875   73.9 
9th–10th decile   50,810      46,903           -7.7    55,879   51,569   -7.7 
    
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
For workers with higher educational attainment (some college or more), social care 
investment appears to raise median earnings relatively more than infrastructure construction 
investment does. The occupational composition of the jobs created by social care investment 
may explain the difference: the sector hires more managers and professionals than 
infrastructure, and these jobs, unlike the lower-skilled occupations, usually offer wages 
comparable to similar jobs in the construction sector. Thus, social care investment appears to be 
more beneficial to highly educated workers than to those with the least education in terms of 
earnings. But one should note that social care investment generates many more jobs for workers 
with less than a high school diploma (500,959) than does infrastructure construction (77,482).  
Workers from the poorest households (1
st-4th decile) definitely receive the largest jump 
in earnings: a more than 200 percent increase in all measures from both types of investment. 
The very low initial earnings of the group are attributable to the jump. Earnings for workers  
27 
 
from middle-income households (5
th-8th decile) increase by more than 50 percent, and the 
infrastructure investment seems to be a slightly better investment for that group. Workers from 
high-income households (9
th-10th decile) show a moderate gain in median earnings but a 
moderate loss in mean earnings. This result implies that earnings from their new jobs are below 
the earnings from their previous jobs. It may be indicative of a downward transition of some of 
the newly hired workers from the high-income groups. Again, the infrastructure investment 
raises the earnings of all groups more than the social care investment does, simply due to 
relatively higher wage rates in construction industries.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The ex ante evaluation of social care expansion demonstrates that investment on caring for the 
elderly, chronically ill, and children under school age is an effective employment-generation 
policy. The labor-intensive nature of care giving is attributable to large employment multipliers 
in the care sector. Direct job creation within the sector accounts for 75-80 percent of all jobs 
created within and across the sectors combined. We also found that the investment on care is 
pro-poor, since workers from poor households take up the most of newly created jobs either by 
targeting design, as in the case of the EPWP, or by the market wage rates. The low wage rates in 
the sector do not deter pro-poor growth, in part because the initial income level of poor 
households is so low that even the small wage earnings are enough to lift their ex post income 
higher in relative terms. On the other hand, the lower wage rates discourage nonpoor workers, 
who perhaps have higher reservation wage rates than the poor ones, to take up the job 
opportunities in the low-paying care sector. Our microsimulation results for the US care 
expansion, compared to construction, confirm this view.  
The social care expansion also contributes to the reduction of poverty directly through 
employment. The change in income from comparable expansion in construction seems to reduce 
income poverty more than that of the care sector. However, one should note that number of jobs 
for the low-income households (1
st-4th decile) under the care expansion is more than 540,000, 
whereas less than 195,000 jobs go to the households in the case of infrastructure expansion. In 
other words, the internal margin of poverty for the participating households may be reduced  
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more under the construction expansion, but the overall reduction of the external margin of 
poverty is much greater under the care expansion.  
Aside from labor market analysis, we provide contextual evidence on the hidden demand 
for care. The insufficient coverage of Head Start and other early childhood development 
programs is evident from the data. The distributional consequences of the short supply of care 
can be significant for the next generation, according to Heckman (2011). Aging baby boomers 
imply higher demand for home-based health care in the United States. The prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in South Africa warrants the wider establishment of a 
home- and community-based care system.
22  
It should be reiterated that the methods used to compute aggregate job creation under 
labor-surplus conditions and low inflationary pressures does not require us to account for 
general equilibrium price effects. Input-output analysis, accordingly, is adequate and sufficient 
for the task at hand, and for both country case studies. Moreover, the detailed classification of 
industries in the analysis makes it possible to identify and utilize industry-level production 
technologies. The disaggregation and accurate representation of specifics in the key industries 
makes up for whatever loss there may be due to absence of price adjustments in the model.  
Distribution of jobs in South African study may seem incomplete, since the unit of 
classification is still an aggregated group of household, whereas the US case study employs 
microsimulation. In defense of using the specific aggregated groups in the SAM, we invoke the 
detrimental effects of the apartheid era: strict segregation and unequal treatment in education 
and employment have left the majority of African population unskilled, poor, with low levels of 
education, and inexperienced as participants in forms of decent paid work. The great deal of in-
group homogeneity, created by racialized segregation, among the majority of the unemployed 
and the bifurcation of those characteristics used in the statistical matching process across the 
whole population make the microsimulation technique based on propensity matching 
inadequate.  
To generalize the framework developed in this paper, it may be desirable to develop a 
computable general equilibrium model with detailed industry classifications that allows for 
supply bottlenecks and market failures in the sense of slack conditions and the 
underemployment of resources in factor markets. Furthermore, ex post program evaluations of 
                                                           
22 Hence, increasing life expectancy would have called for home-based care for the elderly in South Africa as well.  
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the EPWP, provided that necessary datasets are made widely available, could contribute to 
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Table A1.  Summary of Sectoral Input Compositions  
  (% of total) 
 
  Education  Health  EPWP 
Capital  9.8  9.3  0.0 
Male Skilled  20.8  8.7  1.9 
Female Skilled  32.0  16.6  3.2 
Male Unskilled  2.1  1.9  0.0 
Female Unskilled  2.0  5.4  0.0 
EPWP Male  0.0  0.0  13.4 
EPWP Female  0.0  0.0  18.6 
Agriculture   0.1  0.2  10.5 
Utilities  0.4  1.0  0.3 
Construction  0.6  0.6  0.8 
Manufacturing  12.1  23.7  39.9* 
Service  18.6  25.5  11.3 
Exogenous Accounts  1.5  7.1  0.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
Note: The original 25 industry-level data are aggregated into five sector  
levels for reporting purposes. EPWP social sector includes nutrition  
assistance—food security program—which accounts for 31 percent 
of total expenditure on food. Food production, mainly processed food 
industry, is defined as manufacturing sector in the table. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SAM-SA and Friedman et al. (2007) 




Table A2. Job Distribution of Social Care Investment by Gender Skill Level, across Household 
Types 
 
  Direct Jobs Distribution  Indirect Jobs Distribution 


















0  2,677  0  5,468  21,066  9,020  19,316  7,846 
Urban Formal 
African  Poor 
8,064  28  11,203  86  2,000  95  3,541  123 
Urban Formal 
African Ultrapoor 
37,108  2  51,552  8  282  7  857  11 
Urban Formal 
Colored Nonpoor 
0  1,380  0  2,393  10,056  4,649  10,655  3,434 
Urban Formal 
Colored Poor 
1,172  4  1,628  8  412  14  665  12 
Urban Formal 
Colored Ultrapoor 
4,036  0  5,607  1  59  0  75  2 
Urban Formal 
White 
0  4,853  0  6,518  6,872  16,351  6,562  9,353 
Urban Informal 
African Nonpoor 
0  139  0  188  6,957  470  5,004  270 
Urban Informal 
African Poor 
5,638  6  7,833  21  1,267  19  1,568  30 
Urban Informal 
African Ultrapoor 
15,623  0  21,704  2  181  1  516  3 
Rural Commercial 
African Nonpoor 
0  149  0  325  9,488  503  3,927  467 
Rural Commercial 
African Poor 
5,882  6  8.172  15  1,162  19  1,255  21 
Rural Commercial 
African Ultrapoor 
31,476  1  43,728  4  403  2  672  5 
Rural Commercial 
Colored Nonpoor 
0  20  0  37  1,377  66  1,109  54 
Rural Commercial 
Colored Poor 
213  1  296  1  281  2  269  2 
Rural Commercial 
Colored Ultrapoor 
724  0  1,006  0  40  0  26  0 
Rural Commercial 
White 
0  368  0  309  972  1,240  276  443 
Ex-homeland 
African Nonpoor 
0  276  0  928  4,738  929  5,487  1,332 
Ex-homeland 
African Poor 
19,432  16  26,996  56  1,687  55  2,612  80 
Ex-homeland 
African Ultrapoor 
98,817  4  137,282  16  577  13  1,662  22 
Total  228,184  9,928  317,007  16,386  69,875  33,455  66,053  23,511 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 